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The aim of this study is to proof the argument – i.e. ‘there are significant linkages 
amongst tolerance, hybrid identities and migration.’ These linkages can be 
comprehended by means of conceptualising extensions of hybrid identities in aggregate 
trans/inter-migration processes. It can be put forward that arising hybrid identities are 
embedded in a blurring structure of thoughts, beliefs, states of affairs, facts, belongings 
and so forth. From multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism viewpoints, it is argued that 
tolerance and migration ought to be analysed in frame of sociology of law, human rights, 
international migration law, and of course the European Union law. So far, normative 
arguments and soft law approaches are very much well integrated with social aspects of 
migration, tolerance, identity and culture. In this context, the study examines to what 
extent cultural and human components are protected by law in multiple levels from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. In this framework, it is crucial to raise the research 
enquiries: What are possible criteria for the limits of tolerance? To what extent tolerance 
is related to human rights and morality? What ought to be the limit of tolerance towards 
hybrid identities in multicultural and cosmopolitan societies? In a consistent manner, the 
criteria and standards developed by some leading scholars were reconstructed and 
discussed throughout this paper. These criteria and standards are both moral (part of a 
universal system of morality) and legal (international, supranational, or national – i.e. 
constitutional). In order to apply such standards their validity was discussed (i.e. the 
respective normative power has the norms at the various levels). In the case of morals, 
their difference to particular ethnic systems was established (i.e. criteria by which the 
two can be distinguished). Then the research argument was elaborated on whether and 
how the legal standards comply with the moral standards, how national standards comply 
with supranational or international standards. Likewise, the study highlights the crucial 
contributions of “World Society and World System Paradigms” that are associated with 
social space, global civil society, cosmopolitanism, ethnic diversity, cultural hybridity, 
human rights activism and public sphere. Recent debates in Refugee Studies (e.g. Syrian 
Refugee Crisis, Dual and Multiple Citizenship Issues and so forth) highlight the fact that 
the European Union needs to consider new aspects of tolerance for hybrid identities and 
tolerate cultural rights of hybrid identities, create cohesion in communities and establish 
intercultural dialogue amongst home-states and host-states. Sanguinely, the efforts of 
hybrid identities are strengthening the relations between home-host states and these 
ought to attract some considerable attention. The authors of this study hope that their 
endeavours may contribute somewhat towards that. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tolerance notion and the meaning of toleration first had arisen in the 6th century (B.C.) in Eastern 
Civilisations and in the 15th century in the Western Civilisations.1 The very basic distinction amongst 
the Eastern Tolerance and the Western Tolerance is that the Eastern Tolerance had emerged in proto-
historical theological thoughts, beliefs and philosophies (Barnard 1855; Cranmer-Byng 1906; Dawson 
1915; Horten 1912, 1913; Jamil-Ur-Rehman 1921; Köprülü 2013; McPharlin 1939; Müller 1875; Riegel 
2013; Mevlânâ 2005; van Norden 2014; Worms 1900).2 Western Toleration was transformed in the 
Renaissance Age and Protestant Reformation in modern form.3 It took approximately 2000 years for the 
transformation of Eastern Tolerance into a Western form. An interesting point is that the Western 
Tolerance emerged as an instrument of states which are more interested in using it for stabilising 
conflicts, enhancing authority, boosting legitimacy power, extending the content of soft law and 
ensuring harmony in civil society. In other words, the Western Tolerance is seen as a legal tool that 
enables a harmonisation mechanism over people.4 
Habermas supports that tolerance emerged as a consequence of the division of religious sects in Europe 
during 16th century and religious tolerance was transformed as a legal notion between 16th and 17th 
centuries. Moreover, political virtue strengthened the legal dimension of tolerance (Habermas 2005). 
That would be absolutely precise if we consider Eastern Tolerance as “positive tolerance” in terms of 
transcendental-hermeneutic sense. In contrast, Western Tolerance can be perceived as “postmodern-
pragmatic tolerance” in terms of the limits of a classical-liberal foundation, transcendental-pragmatic 
sense, deontological ethics and obstacles of ideologies, nationalism and presuppositions (Apel 1997). In 
other words, the Western Postmodern-pragmatic Tolerance is a cumulative misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding of the cultural heritage, transmission, tradition and values (Ricœur 1973) of the 
Eastern Positive Tolerance. This study does not deal with an in-depth comparison of two various 
approaches. Rather, this study particularly concentrates on the normative aspects of the confines, 
constraints, obstacles and limits of tolerance and toleration within the EU in a bit critical manner. The 
criticisms will be restricted to the European perception of tolerance and toleration. 
In classical style of (post)colonial past, many people immigrated to wealthy nations of Europe for 
attaining better life conditions because the image of Europe was perceived as a source of enlightenment, 
modernity, secularity, development and equal rights. Thus, states which could not reach democratic 
standards and create workplaces for unemployed people, experienced mass migration flows (Aliu 2012, 
2013; Said 1994). These flows formed ethnic enclaves and cultural ghettos within Europe. The genesis 
of hybrid identities that symbolises the people, who complete integration/assimilation and adjustment 
process, emerged particularly in ethnic enclaves and cultural ghettos. Progressively, hybrid identities 
                                                     
1 Eastern tolerance was developed by Lao-Tzu, 老 子 (604-531 B.C.), Gautama Buddha (563-480 B.C.), 
Confucius, 孔  夫  子  (551-479 B.C.), Zhong You, 仲  由  (542-480 B.C.), Yan Hui, 顏  回  (521-481 B.C.), Mozi, 
墨  子  (470-391 B.C.), Mengzi, 孟子 (372-289 B.C.), Zhuang Zhou, 莊  子  (369-286 B.C.) Xunzi, 荀  子  (300-
230 B.C.), Han Feizi, 韓  非  子  (280-233 B.C.), Bâyezid-î Bistâmî (804-874), Hallâc-ı Mansûr (858-922), El 
Gazâli (1058-1111), Abd el-Kadir Gīlānī (1077-1166), Hâce Ahmed Yesevî (1093-1166), Ibn Rushd (Averroës) 
(1126-1198), Muhyiddin İbn-i Arabi (1165-1240), Şems-i Tebrîzî (1185-1248), Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-î (Belhî) 
Rûmî (1207-1273), Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî (1209-1271) and many others. 
2 It is worth noting that the Eastern Tolerance is more nature-sensitive and peace-oriented. It is assumed that the 
Eastern Tolerance owes its value of various insights to the Chinese and Indian Civilisations. These proto-classical 
perspectives were sources of inspiration for other Asian and Arabic Civilisations. 
3 Whereas modern tolerance was structured by Nikolaus von Kues (1401-1464), Thomas More (1478-1535), 
Martin Luther (1483-1546), Sébastien Castellion (1515-1563), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), William Shakespeare 
(1564-1616), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), John Locke (1632-1704), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Montesquieu 
(1689-1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
(1729-1781) and many others. 
4 This is the most vital and critical issue which brings a “distancation” amongst Eastern Tolerance and Western 
Tolerance. Thus, different approaches of Western Tolerance cannot be seen as an alternative of Eastern Tolerance. 
At the time when it is seen as an alternative, then this causes to a lost of meaning in the context. This situation 
pushes us adopting the fact that a far-distancation of Eastern-Western Tolerance perception may result for two 
seperated perspectives into two categories – i.e. Eastern Religious Tolerance and Western Legal Tolerance. 
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were encouraged to have a dual or multi characters and this situation established a constant system of 
circulation amongst home-state(s) and host-state(s). 
The rise of new threats; such as, terrorism, xenophobia, racism, violence, cultural hybridity via 
assimilation, and aggressive nationalism or ethno-culturalism created pressures on hybrid identities 
because all of these implied a pushing effect from both sides that are home and host states (Bulag 1998; 
Burke 2009; Drichel 2008; Field 1999; Hutnyk 2005; Kavas & Thornton 2013; Kawash 1997; Kraidy 
2005; McWilliams 2013; Laffey & Nadarajah 2012; Nafafé 2012; Papastergiadis 2000; Pieterse 2001; 
Pnina & Modood 1997; Ramos-García 2002; Riemer 1999). 
In the light of these considerations, there is a need to pose these research enquiries:  What ought to be 
the limit of tolerance towards hybrid identities in multicultural and cosmopolitan societies? What are 
possible criteria for the limits of tolerance? To what extent tolerance is related to human rights and 
morality? This study is composed of four sections. First section was devoted to the nexus amongst 
tolerance and human rights. Second section deals with obstacles and limits of tolerance and clarifies to 
what extent morality is related to tolerance. Third section gives information about world system and 
world society paradigms. In the fourth section identity enquiry was argued in frame of multiculturalism 
and cosmopolitanism. 
 
1. Tolerance and Human Rights 
Tolerance takes root in the same soil as human rights. And this root is at the same time shared by liberty 
and truth (Hersch 1996). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) defined tolerance as such: 
Tolerance means respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of the world’s cultures, forms 
of expression and ways of being human. This term is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication 
and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. It is also a harmony in difference. It is not only a moral 
duty, but also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, 
contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace. Tolerance is an active attitude 
prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no 
circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fundamental values. Tolerance is to be 
exercised by individuals, groups and states. Tolerance is the responsibility that upholds human rights, 
pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. It involves the rejection of dogmatism and absolutism and 
affirms the standards set out in international human rights instruments. Tolerance means accepting the 
fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and values, 
have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. The word “right” enters into many descriptions of 
tolerance: the right to live humanely, the right to difference, to liberty, to those fundamental public 
freedoms that constitute human rights (UNESCO 1996). 
In the context of human rights, equal rights need to be mentioned first and foremost. They are the basis 
of a tolerant legal system. Equal constitutional rights of expression of opinions, religious faith, 
organisation and non-discrimination are the core of any acceptable democratic constitution. These equal 
rights command the respect of the other individuals having the same rights and hence are the core of 
any rational concept of tolerance. A tolerant society is built upon the principle of non-domination, of 
equal rights of people including the rights of hybrid identities (Aliu 2011). 
In a country where religious dogma, historical traditions, regional idiosyncrasies and laws are 
intermixed, tolerance is concretely impossible. If tolerance is one of the fundamental principles of 
modernity, this modernity is not one that has been agreed upon a global level. It is subject to tensions 
according to which its future and fate shall unfold (Waterlot 1996). Tolerance at the “EU member state 
level” requires just and neutral legislation, law enforcement and judicial and administrative process. 
Normatively, EU member states ratify existing international human rights conventions, and draft new 
legislation where necessary to ensure equality of treatment and opportunity for groups and individuals 
within society in order to achieve a more tolerant society. It is essential for international harmony that 
individuals, communities and nations accept and respect the multicultural character and diversity of the 
human family. 
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Tolerance finds ways to protect the rights and dignity of every individual within nations and societies. 
In this way, when we consider tolerance within nations and societies, one question comes to mind: Is 
tolerance to be considered as singular form or plural form? On the one hand, if tolerance is considered 
as a singular form, we can call person or people as intolerable such as; racist, religious, anti-Semitist or 
anti-Islamist and so on. On the other hand, if tolerance is considered as a plural form, we can call nations 
or societies as the same way. We can think tolerance from the viewpoint of two various perspectives – 
i.e. subject and object (Kuçuradi 1996: 165). The subject of tolerance is about “personal attitude”; 
whereas, the object of tolerance is about a “demand concerning the arrangement and administration of 
public affairs.” It can be asserted that the subject of tolerance is a singular form and the object of 
tolerance is a plural form (Kuçuradi 1996).5 In essence, tolerance is pertinent merely when some aspect 
of a person or group is felt to be morally or aesthetically unacceptable, or at least very offensive, and 
only when the party practising tolerance has sufficient power to oppress the party disliked; otherwise, 
forbearance from oppression has no meaning (Sokol 2008: xi). 
Tolerance is related to moral rights. In societies, people want to interact with each other in the context 
of moral perspective. Society has a right to enforce its morality by law because the majority have the 
right to follow their own moral convictions that their moral environment is a thing of value to be 
defended from change – i.e. the disintegration thesis.6 At this point, many obstacles appear in front of 
disintegrated people. These obstacles create limits at toleration of the people with hybrid identities. 
These obstacles and limits of tolerance were expanded in the following section. 
 
2. Obstacles and Limits of Tolerance and the Nexus Between Tolerance and Morality 
The high political use value of the concept of toleration highlights the fact that one always tries to 
construct one’s own position as tolerant and that of the others as intolerant, lying beyond the proper 
limits of toleration (Forst 2004). The problem of the limits of tolerance concerns tolerance merely as a 
principle of public affairs, but not as a personal attitude. Tolerance as a personal attitude has no limits 
because its object is not the radically different views, norms or practices of other individuals; 
consequently, it is an attitude taken independently from the epistemological and axiological quality of 
those views and norms, and because there is no limit to respecting others’ rights that have to be carefully 
distinguished from others’ interests (Kuçuradi 1996: 171). In this regard, the limits of toleration are to 
be drawn where intolerance begins. For instance, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe considered tolerance as 
a dilemma. He saw a paradox of constraints in each tolerance act that is a delimitation of a cluster which 
covers both tolerance and intolerance in itself. He stated that there cannot be an inclusion without any 
exclusion. Goethe’s tolerance dilemma was overcome by a constitutional and legal order that confines 
tolerance within legal base (Habermas 2005). 
According to Ricœur, intolerance constitutes the obstacle never surmounted, the intolerable, the limit 
opposed to the abuses of a tolerance that has slid to indifference. In the dissonance between the respect 
owed to human rights and the respect asked by all cultures, the ultimate source of intolerance, which 
makes of it at the same time the first intolerable. It includes also a moral and legal dimension. To the 
extent the balance between obstacle and limit rests on a practical wisdom capable of inspiring the 
education of tolerance (Ricœur 1996a: 161). Respecting differences of other individuals balances 
intolerable situations. 
Habermas (2003a) argued that, toleration first becomes necessary when someone rejects the convictions 
of others. People do not need to be tolerant if they are indifferent towards other beliefs and attitudes or 
even if they appreciate otherness. The principle of respect to everyone, not merely to (ethnic) citizens, 
                                                     
5 Kuçuradi assumed that tolerant people do not tolerate the radically different views, opinions, norms or attitudes, ways of 
behaviour, practices, and given actions of the others, but tolerate the existence of these others (Kuçuradi 1996: 166). When we 
think as a singular or plural form, the intolerant people do not or cannot tolerate the existence of views, opinions, norms which 
are different from those that the intolerant people strongly believe to be true or of the ways of behaviour and practices radically 
different from those they strongly believe to be good. Tolerant people respect differences; accept others as a humanity principle; 
do not want to damage others’ rights and discriminate. 
6 “There is disintegration when no common morality is observed and history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often 
the first stage of disintegration (Hart 1967: 3).” As a result of the disintegration of other people within society, majority cannot 
tolerate some reasons because the things that the people with hybrid identities insist on can be odd for majority. 
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ought to be valid for other people; including, third country nationals, hybrid identities, foreign citizens 
and refugees. Reciprocal respect and the way to increase the inclusiveness can be via cultural and 
democratic interactions, political will and public communication (Habermas 1997). 
Tolerant person takes toleration as his fundamental life principle. This illustrates that a tolerant person 
tolerate because moral values which are seen in the society let him to act in this way. The basic moral 
principle tells us that a tolerant person is right and an intolerant person is wrong. However, there is also 
a contradiction when we say an intolerant person waits for more toleration from majority. The structure 
of society indicates the main reason of this contradiction. Tolerance is a virtue of democratic citizens, 
and so drawing and defending the limits of toleration is a special task of the members of civil society 
(Ricœur 1996a). 
Tolerance can only be thought of as reciprocal. An individual or a community that defines itself as being 
superior, not having a duty of respect to everyone in society accepting them as equals puts itself or 
himself outside of society hence has no right to claim tolerance. Therefore, intolerance is immoral in a 
deep sense (Aliu 2011). A democratic society is often considered more tolerant than others because it is 
not content to put up with differences, but rather encourages or even engenders them (Garapon 1996). 
In this respect, we may acknowledge the fact that the tolerance-intolerance dialectic and the limits of 
tolerance and toleration and all discussion associated with these issues can be linked up with normativity 
in legal base of states. The great transformation of western legal tolerance puts normativity power and 
legal regulations that states use their judicial power to control and regulate the tensions of intolerance 
and intolerants. 
The law is always seen in a way universal and non-legally binding soft-law regulations merely cannot 
guarantee equitability and just in democratic societies. Equitable and antidiscrimination are basis 
elements for the member states of the European Union (Ricœur 2000). For instance, the basis elements 
and European values were clarified in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty). In Article 2 (Title I – Common 
Provisions) it was denoted that: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (The European Union 2016: 17).” 
Habermas (2003a) asserted that governments issued toleration edicts that compelled state officials and 
a population that believed in the rule of law, to be tolerant in their behaviour towards religious 
minorities. This legal act of toleration by the state authorities led to people being expected to behave 
tolerantly towards members of religious communities that had previously been oppressed or persecuted. 
The toleration of religious minorities was justified only pragmatically in order to maintain law and order; 
for legalistic reasons, since spontaneous convictions elude legal constraint; or for epistemological 
reasons, since the human mind is deemed to be fallible. 
“The contrast inherent in the idea of tolerance is justified with recourse to the idea of moral autonomy. 
The other’s morality is in his or her own hands, and it is not the business of others to interfere; political 
tolerance is then nothing more than a corollary (Ricœur 1996b: 26).” The idea of political tolerance 
based on the state’s role to impose one way of living as opposed to another, even that which refers to 
the idea of autonomy. It is therefore on the legitimation of political authority that the debate is displaced. 
At this point, autonomy-authority relations enhance a variety of moral attitudes, capable of lending 
support to political liberalism and individuals’ interactions in civil societies. Similarly, civil society 
organisations and epistemic communities strengthen democracy and morality within nations. 
Modern societies in the EU ought to rethink Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” idea in order to start negotiations 
for embedding tolerance and morality in civil societies. Kant’s universal citizenship is an ideal type, and 
it comprises both freedom and rationality.7  
                                                     
7 The critique of Habermas (2003b) for the book which is entitled “A Theory of Justice” written by Prof. John Rawls is that the 
book does not reflect the core ideas of famous philosophers and justice thinkers. Even though this book covers Kant’s 
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Most national citizens have become at the same time citizens of the world. Kant predicted this situation 
and wrote that “the people of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, 
and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. 
The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement 
to the unwritten code of international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only 
under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace 
(Günther 2005: 379).”  
Bernard Williams argued that since “genuine” tolerance is equivalent to satisfying a Kantian demand 
for respecting others’ autonomy as a good in itself, and since this kind of respect is unlikely to be 
widespread; it is as well that the real-world practice of toleration does not depend upon it. A 
consideration of a symmetrical tolerance between unequal people by making the distinction that 
toleration as a political undertaking introduces the asymmetry between groups associated with the 
concept but a tolerant attitude can obtain just as much between groups who are not equal in power (Sokol 
2008). 
To understand how tolerant the legal state should be, the aspects of legitimacy and effectiveness need 
to be distinguished. As far as legitimacy is concerned, “zero tolerance” is called for with respect to 
violent attacks. Likewise, scholars need to consider questions of effectiveness, for it may well be that 
such legal restrictions are not very successful and can even lead to unintended, negative side-effects. At 
times it can be more useful not to defend the limits of toleration by means of laws but instead out of 
pragmatic considerations to exercise tolerance towards groups that are in principle intolerable (Forst 
2004). To speak of tolerance only makes sense where there is a normative objection against certain 
beliefs or practices. It is to be made a distinction between toleration (i.e. one allows others’ ethical values 
but does not respect them) and tolerance (i.e. mutual respect of the others’ individual and ethical values 
as equal and just). Society cannot tolerate the racists. The latter puts one outside of the universal moral 
values needed to be shared by all individuals (Aliu 2011). Hart and others have shown that modern legal 
systems include also secondary norms, rules of empowerment and rules of organisation that serve to 
institutionalise processes of legislation, adjudication, and administration (Habermas 1988: 229). 
“New international challenges resulting from the acknowledgement of a right to humanitarian 
intervention include the use of compulsory measures. For example, resistance is not based on religious 
beliefs or convictions; rather, it is based on the longstanding political principle of state sovereignty 
(Ricœur 1996c: 52).” From this viewpoint, the right to humanitarian intervention constitutes a violation 
of the principle of non-interference within a state. How does this consensual limitation on the principle 
of sovereignty relate to the problem of tolerance? It relates to the cry of victims calling out for the help 
constitutes the ultimate legitimation of this still gestating right. The issue of humanitarian intervention 
is strongly associated with the world system and world society paradigms. 
 
3. World System and World Society Paradigms 
Two paradigmatic Schools which are covered by the globalisation debate namely are; i) World System 
theories and ii) World Society theories. The World System theories were developed to counter the 
theorisation of social spaces as national or macro-regional geographic “containers.” Opposing the 
theories of World Civilisations in which perception of the world is a collection of distinct and divided 
civilisations, the World System theories emphasise the far-reaching economic interchanges and political 
subordination that exist between different cultural regions and civilisations. Key figures of the theories 
of World System are Fernand Braudel, Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, Ralf Dahrendorf and Immanuel 
Wallerstein. These scientists defended the argument that World Civilisations are established by those 
superstates exclusively that enable to fill the whole space of “Global World Economy.” Latterly, the 
global world economy was transformed in a modern capitalist world system and the embeddedness of 
this system was strengthened by occidental rationalism, liberal capitalism and transnationalism (Braudel 
1983, 1984, 1985; Dahrendorf 1959; Polanyi 2001; Pries 2001; Wallerstein 1976, 2006; Weber 1922). 
                                                     
arguments, there is not any definite explanation for how can “Perpetual Peace” idea become real and how universal citizenship 
can exist (Habermas 1995). 
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On the base of a critique of the aforementioned paradigmatic school, the theories of World Society were 
structured idealistically and constructivistically on the concept of social. Key figures of this School are 
Niklas Luhmann, Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Leslie Sklair, Malcolm James Waters, Martin Albrow 
and David Held. In the World Society approach, the “social space” of society is explicitly separated 
from the “geographic space.” The civil society remains at the core point of the dialectics of globalisation 
and localisation. The mixture of various levels ensures a blurring structure in which geographic spaces 
(i.e. the micro-regional, the national, the macro-regional and the global) correspond to different types of 
predominant social spaces (i.e. community, national society, civilisation / cultural region and humanity). 
The “transnational social spaces” approach is an attempt to overcome the economic, functional and 
macroscopic biases of the world system theories by giving central attention to social practices, symbol 
systems and artefacts as empirically detectable phenomena growing “from below” that are structured by 
and reproduced social institutions in plural-local social spaces (Luhmann 1983, 1985; Vertovec 2001a). 
Whereas civilisation theories maintained the mutual embeddedness of social and geographic space and 
widened it to macro-regions, world system theories that followed similarly expanded the social-
geographic container to the globe as a whole (Luhmann 1996, 1997, 2011; Pries 2001). 
In the light of these clarifications, Luhmann claimed that all attempts at building a unified theory of 
society on the basis of the critical/positivist distinction had to lead into the paradox of treating 
appearance and reality, or latent and manifest structures. However, the society as a self-observing system 
defined its own identity in theories of self-referential systems, autopoietic system closure, the second-
order cybernetics of observing systems, and constructivist epistemology and information processing 
(Luhmann 1984, 1994, 1995a, 1995b,). The comprehensive societal analyses of Luhmann are quite 
substantial for arguing identity enquiry. For further evaluation of identity formation within societies, 
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism perspectives were discussed in the following section. 
 
4. Identity Enquiry in Frame of Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism 
The pluralistic universe has become now pluralistic society or multicultural society. Thus tolerance 
ought to be promoted for facing the “conflicts of cultures and especially those within multicultural 
societies (Kuçuradi 1996). Multiculturalism in the EU has caused the proliferation of multilingualism 
and translation of EU official documents, many scientific publications and press releases into official 
languages of the EU member states (Öztürk 2011). The spread of multilingualism strengthened the motto 
of the EU – i.e. the creation of unity in diversity or vice versa. Similarly, the growing trend of publishing 
houses and the development of media channels facilitated multilingualism and fast transformation of 
identities within multicultural and cosmopolitan societies.  
According to Baumann, multiculturalism is a riddle or a paradox. It asks how we can establish a state of 
justice and equality between and amongst three parties; those who believe in a unified national culture, 
those who trace their culture to their ethnic identity, and those who view their religion as culture. To 
solve the riddle, one needs to rethink what is meant by nationality or the nation-state, by ethnic identity 
or ethnicity, and by religion as a basis of culture. Multiculturalism can be considered as a new and 
internally plural, praxis of culture applied to oneself and to others (Baumann 1999: vii). 
The transnational challenges to multiculturalism suggest a real recognition of diversity that includes 
cultural difference and community belonging. In multiple or hybridised identities, many diversities of 
attachments and belongings (i.e. people, places, traditions and so forth) are shaped outside of the 
containing limits of nation-state residence.  Thus, hybridised identities sustain and mediate complex 
affiliations and multiple attachments (Vertovec 1999, 2001b, 2007). An enhanced 'bifocality' of outlooks 
underpinning migrant lives lived here-and-there; such dual orientations have considerable influence on 
transnational family life and may continue to affect identities amongst subsequent post-migration 
generations. In this framework, social network, social capital and embeddedness have proven valuable 
to be analysed and associated with transformation of identity (Vertovec 2003, 2004). 
Many scientists observe that there are separate lives not only in the EU member states but also 
everywhere in the world. Understanding what others are really saying, why they act the way they do, 
and how the basic issues of human life appear to them are quite important: This level of empathy 
demands a greater capacity for listening and observing rather than of speaking and judging (Aliu 2011). 
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The core question is whether other people do want to integrate to the EU. Because, many people who 
are not EU citizens or have hybrid identities, want to continue their lives as separate from society. In 
passing time, these separate lives shape lost identities which do not feel that they belong to a particular 
society or culture. Therefore, understanding is extremely important for creation better life conditions 
and linking cultural diversity and harmony in the EU. 
Despite the fact that multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are complex processes, these can bring 
people closer. However, who will take the first step? In this context, cosmopolitanism can be seen as a 
key term. Cosmopolitanism means recognition of otherness, both external and internal to any society: 
in a cosmopolitan ordering of society, differences are neither ranged in a hierarchy nor dissolved into 
universality, but are accepted. Debates between exponents of universalism and relativism, or between 
those of sameness and diversity, are generally conducted as either/or propositions. From the realistic 
cosmopolitanism it should be understood and practiced in conscious relation to universalism, 
contextualism, nationalism, transnationalism, interdependence, multitude of interconnections and other 
current approaches to otherness. The cosmopolitan vision shares with these a combination of semantic 
elements that serves to differentiate it from all other approaches (Beck 2004a, 2004b; Beck & Sznaider 
2006; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2009; Beck & Grande 2010).8 
How can the EU be taken seriously, if it promotes a cosmopolitanism approach to foster respect, 
tolerance and diversity, and at the same time continues to discriminate along the different non-
discrimination grounds? European legislation does not cover discrimination outside the labour market 
on the grounds of religion or belief. The cosmopolitanism approach of the EU designed to foster respect, 
tolerance and diversity can raise awareness in the member states, amongst groups in civil societies. 
During the process of Eastern Enlargement of the EU in the 1990s, the EU was sometimes heavily 
criticised for its double standard. The EU asked the acceding states to show ‘respect for and protection 
of minorities’ as a condition for membership, but did not put the old member states along the same 
yardstick (Swiebel 2008: 109). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study claims that there is a very strong linkage between tolerance, migration and hybrid identities. 
The mixture of various levels ensures a blurring structure in which home and host countries of migrants 
and refugees have different legal sources for tolerance and toleration. The diversification of treatment 
of people according to legal sources puts the issue of citizenship and belonging in the forefront. The EU 
is experiencing a very interesting problem. The refugees’ crisis and increasing asylum seekers are 
rapidly boosting the problem of the accumulation of hybrid identities in ethnic enclaves and cultural 
ghettos all around the EU. The tolerance and toleration towards these people have become an issue of 
concern due the increasing tensions and the lack of communication within societies. 
European attempts to stimulate ethno-cultural diversity in the new member states have focused less on 
group-related rights but have emphasised the importance of social inclusion, anti-discrimination and 
equal opportunities (Vermeersch 2007: 18). The system of universal moral obligations, including respect 
for human rights, is compatible with diversity of particular ethical beliefs. But this is the basis for a 
democratic state that incorporates tolerance. It needs to incorporate common identical rights for all and 
the guarantee of the opportunity for all people including hybrid identities. 
The multi-ethnic hybridity of many people who share neoethnic endorsement of national unity create 
hybrid identities which contain super ethnical characteristics. All identities are identifications, all 
identifications are dialogical, and all struggles for a common dream are practical. In this context, human 
                                                     
8 The cosmopolitan gaze is stimulated by the postmodern mix of boundaries between cultures and identities, accelerated by the 
dynamics of capital and consumption by state and non-state actors, empowered by capitalism undermining national borders, 
excited by the global audience of transnational social movements, and guided and encouraged by the evidence of worldwide 
communication (Beck 2000, 2003, 2005). Further, as opposed to methodological nationalism, methodological cosmopolitanism 
is a promising lens through which to look at questions of diversity. And it is essential to draw an essential distinction between 
“cosmopolitanism” in a normative philosophical sense and “cosmopolitanisation” as a structural phenomenon and as a social 
scientific research programme (Beck 2011a, 2011b). 
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rights, civil rights and community rights deliver partial promises at best of fulfiling the multicultural 
dream. To turn from dreaming to meaning, three components of the multicultural triangle ought to be 
taken into account – i.e. the nation-state and its national identity, the idea of ethnicity or ethnic identity, 
and the workings of religion and religious identity (Baumann 1999). 
The ways of tolerance exist at various levels (i.e. the juridical level, the educational level and 
communication and mass-media level). For instance, the image of hybrid identities in the mass media is 
a very strong tool, as the media gain importance in social life and are often the mirror of society in which 
they are produced (Serin 1990). The production of radio and TV programmes by the hybrid identities 
should be given greater space in national and private channels. The contribution of people of different 
cultures also should be encouraged in producing creative and exchange-oriented programmes. Legal 
ways to tolerance involves people of different cultures living in the same country. It implies the 
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. Codes of conduct have been established in relation to 
employment agencies, laws introduced to afford legal protection to migrants, refugees and marginalised 
communities, both administratively and by right of action. In this context, it is also important to refer to 
the role of public opinion movements for the establishment and enforcement of such protective measures 
for migrants, refugees and marginalised communities. 
In the EU tolerance perspective, tolerance requires impartial law enforcement, judicial process, and 
impartial legislation at EU supranational level. In addition, it also requires that economic and social 
opportunities be given to each person without any discrimination. Likewise, in order to achieve a more 
tolerant society in the EU, member states should harmonise existing human rights conventions with 
ethical beliefs and moral conducts. Tolerance, mutual understanding, and the respect of the rights of 
individuals are quite crucial in order to provide harmony, coexistence, and peace not only at the member 
state level but also at the EU level. The pluralistic societies, multicultural societies or cosmopolitan 
societies need now tolerance more than ever before. Further, in view of facing the conflicts of cultures, 
and especially those within multicultural societies, tolerance ought to be promoted and guaranteed not 
merely on the basic normative principles and soft law regulations but also on ethical beliefs, moral 
consciousness and even Eastern Tolerance wisdom and heritages. 
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